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Abstract: The role of the state in promoting development is well established in the institutional 
economics literature. Yet, in recent decades the attention has been turned to the opposite side of 
the spectrum. Facing high levels of poverty and showing a slower progress in achieving 
development outcomes, fragile states raised concerns among the development community, which 
felt urged to assist them. However, the quantitative empirical literature examining the link between 
state fragility and development is still relatively scanty. This paper sheds light on this issue by 
proposing an approach that comprises indicators for state ineffectiveness and political violence as 
two dimensions of state fragility, and by using data for the period 1993–2012 in order to 
understand their impact on growth. The results from standard econometric methods suggest that 
there is a significant negative effect of state ineffectiveness on economic growth, whereas they fail 
to find any significant impact of political violence. 
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1 
1 Introduction 
The role of the state in promoting development has been discussed at length in the institutional 
economics literature. Recent reviews highlight that, notwithstanding the variety of perspectives, 
existing studies agree on some common state characteristics that are favourable to the promotion 
of development (Bardhan 2016). However, as a result of the events over the last decades (e.g. the 
9/11 attacks), increasing attention has been brought to the implications for development when a 
state fails to fulfil these features. Facing high levels of poverty and showing a slower progress in 
achieving development outcomes, fragile states attracted the attention from the development 
community, which felt urged to assist them. The focus is back on the state, but the quantitative 
empirical literature examining the link between state fragility and development is still relatively 
scanty. This paper sheds light on this issue by applying standard econometric techniques to data 
for the period 1993–2012, and by using indices of state ineffectiveness and political violence as 
the core dimensions of state fragility, to understand their impact on growth. 
The weight of the evidence suggests that, as expected, state ineffectiveness has a significant 
negative effect on economic growth. This result is robust to variations in the data used and the 
estimation method employed. The conclusion for the effect of political violence is less clear-cut. 
In contrast to the expectation, there is some evidence suggesting a positive effect, but this result 
is not robust to variations in the specifications used. Additionally, the estimated coefficients show 
no robust effect of fragility on growth when a unidimensional index is considered. 
This has important implications for development policy. Firstly, it provides some support for the 
view reiterated recently in the World Development Report 2017 (World Bank 2017) that 
improving governance is essential to overcome the challenges currently faced by developing 
countries. Secondly, this paper concurs to the argument that, in order to unpack the complexity 
of state fragility and its effects, one should consider its different dimensions separately. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section establishes the links between this analysis and 
the existing literature. Section 3 explains how state fragility is conceptualized and measured, 
whereas section 4 presents the empirical model and describes the data used. The main results are 
analysed in section 5, which also includes some robustness checks. Finally, section 6 discusses the 
results in relation to the existing literature, and section 7 concludes. 
2 Overview of the literature 
Despite being at the core of the discourse on fragile states, the link between state fragility and 
economic development has only been examined in the context of cross-country regressions in a 
few studies.1 Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2010) distinguish between empirical studies focusing on the 
direct impact of fragility on economic development, and those exploring an indirect effect through 
aid. This paper contributes to the first of these groups.  
                                                 
1 The field of political science is not short of accounts of the challenges imposed by failing and failed states, especially 
before the fragile states term came into use. The reports from development organisations also include quantitative 
and qualitative evidence on the effects of state fragility on development. Given the focus of this paper, these are not 
reviewed here. 
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In an early account, Chauvet et al. (2007) explore the costs of failing states, defined as the Low-
Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) that have been in this position for a continuous period 
of at least four years. Considering the period 1998–2001, they add dummy variables for failing 
states, for states in civil war, and for neighbourhood spillovers to a growth regression, and then 
use ordinary least squares (OLS) and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) methods to 
estimate the percentage of reduction in the growth rate. They conclude that being a failing state at 
peace corresponds to a decrease in the growth rate by 2.6 per cent when compared to countries at 
peace with adequate policies and governance. Furthermore, a switch from peace to war leads to a 
further reduction in growth of 1.6 per cent. 
Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2010) use data for 28 Sub-Saharan African countries during the period 
1999–2004 and consider as fragile states the countries belonging to the bottom two quintiles of 
the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating, or unrated. After applying both 
pooled OLS and Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS), they conclude that there is no significant impact 
of fragility on economic growth. However, when restricting the list of fragile states to those 
countries belonging to the bottom quintile of the CPIA rating or unrated, the results show a clear, 
negative impact. 
Despite the profusion of studies examining the effect on growth of related factors – such as 
corruption, institutional quality, or state capacity, among others –  to the best of the author’s 
knowledge, these are the only studies that focus explicitly on the examination of the link between 
state fragility per se and economic growth in the context of cross-country regressions.2 This paper 
contributes to this literature by using an alternative measure of fragility that is not based on the 
CPIA and considering the two dimensions separately.  
By focusing on the impact of state ineffectiveness and political violence on economic growth, this 
paper also contributes to different strands of studies within the growth literature. The first 
contribution is towards the group of studies rooted in the idea that different rates of economic 
growth can be explained by differences in state capacity and the level of institutions. The second 
is the line of argument that examines the impact of different dimensions of political violence on 
growth rates. I refer to Maier (2010) for a more comprehensive review, but for the sake of 
completeness, I also provide a brief overview in the following paragraphs. 
2.1 Effect of state capacity and institutions on growth 
Over the last decades, there has been an increasing focus on governance and a tendency towards 
assessing its level by using the lenses of the state, and underlining the importance of state capacity 
as an essential feature for effective governance (Savoia and Sen 2015). Due to its 
multidimensionality, state capacity has been conceptualized and measured in a variety of ways, and 
different authors have focused on different mechanisms through which the state affects 
development outcomes (Savoia and Sen 2015: 442).3  
Evans and Rauch (1999) find a strong association between ‘Weberianness’ and economic growth 
in 35 emerging economies for the period 1970–90. Their ‘Weberianness Scale’ is a measure of the 
degree to which meritocratic recruitment and the offer of predictable, rewarding long-term careers 
characterizes core state agencies (Evans and Rauch 1999: 749). The results in Bockstette et al. 
                                                 
2 Even though Chauvet et al.s (2007) work refers to failing states, their definition is close to that of fragile states.  
3 I refer to Cingolani (2013) for a comprehensive overview. 
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(2002) show a positive association between state antiquity and economic growth for 94 countries 
over the period 1960–95. 
Another line of work uses measures of institutional quality in the empirical analysis. Focusing on 
the period 1974–89, Knack and Keefer (1995) found that institutions that protect property rights 
are crucial for investment and growth. Extending the period until 2000 and using three alternative 
measures for the level of corruption, including the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
index, Mendez and Sepulveda (2006) concluded that there is a non-linear relationship between 
corruption and growth, with corruption being favourable at low levels of incidence and harmful 
to economic growth at high levels of incidence. Bosworth and Collins (2003) argue that a part of 
the cross-country variation in economic growth over the period 1960–2000 can be explained by 
the quality of the governing institutions (e.g. law and order, absence of corruption, and protection 
of property rights).4  
Some authors have started to unpack the concept of state capacity by distinguishing between 
different components (see Bardhan 2016, for an overview). For instance, using different indicators 
of governance from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators database, but focusing 
on the impact of regulatory quality, Jalilian et al. (2007) suggest that there is a strong causal link 
between this dimension and growth.5 
2.2 Effect of political violence on growth 
Parallel to this literature, a large number of papers have examined the significance of political 
variables in growth regressions.6 Some authors have tested the relationship between repression or 
its opposite, political freedom, on economic growth. An early study by Chen and Feng (1996) 
reports that the analysis of cross-sectional data for 88 countries for the period 1974–90 confirms 
the expected negative effect of government repression on economic growth. Considering the 
period 1975–2004, and using data for about 100 countries, Chauffour (2011) found a positive 
effect of civic and political rights on economic growth. 
Focusing on the growth effect of civil wars7, Collier (1999) observed that, when considering all 
civil wars during the period 1960–92, the results indicate a decline of income per capita at an 
annual rate of 2.2 per cent during civil wars in comparison to its counterfactual. This is in line with 
previous work that has found the link between civil war incidence and economic growth to be 
negative (e.g. Barro 1991).  More recently, the results obtained by Murdoch and Sandler (2004) 
show that in the short-run (5-year period), per capita real income growth is predicted to be 0.05 
percentage points less if there is a civil war in the country during that period. Bodea and Elbadawi 
(2008) concur to the view that political violence, and particularly civil war, has a significant negative 
effect on growth. Although Biswas et al. (2016) fail to find a significant effect of ethnic civil war 
on income growth over the period 1975–2005, the negative contemporaneous impact of non-
ethnic war is significant. 
However, other work focusing on the long-run impact points to the opposite effect. Organski and 
Kugler (1977) find that 15–20 years after the war its effects have dissipated and countries recover 
                                                 
4 The connection with the literature on ‘good governance’ is also apparent, but will not be explored here. 
5 More tangentially, this paper also relates to the work testing the link between institutions factors and economic 
growth in the long-run. I refer to Nunn (2009) for an overview of this research. 
6 I refer to Carmignani (2003) for a more complete overview. It is important to highlight that the studies discussed 
here explore the variation across countries, but in most cases employ panel data methods. 
7 I refer to Bove et al. (2017) for a more detailed literature review. 
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the level of pre-war performance, a phenomenon that authors label as the ‘phoenix factor’. More 
recently, also using cross-sectional data, but extending the period until 2001, Cerra and Saxena 
(2008: 442) show evidence of a partial rebound of output following a civil war. Still, some authors 
also fail to find any significant effect (e.g. Aisen and Veiga 2013; Jong-A-Pin 2009).  
The literature focusing specifically on coups d’état is scarcer. Using data for 121 countries over the 
period 1950–82, Londregan and Poole (1990) failed to find evidence of a significant effect of either 
the recent history of coups or the current propensity for a coup d’état. In contrast, Fosu (2002) 
found an adverse effect of coup events in Sub-Saharan African countries over the 1960–86 period. 
Overall, existing studies seem to indicate that there is a positive (negative) effect of state 
effectiveness (ineffectiveness) on growth. In the case of political violence, the literature suggests 
that considering different dimensions and time periods may point to divergent effects. Thus, the 
overall impact may be less clear. 
3 Conceptualizing and measuring state fragility 
Despite the mounting number of analytical tools that have appeared in response to the demand 
for orientation on how to deal with fragile states, the concept remains obscure and the 
quantification efforts have been subjected to criticism. It has been argued that, in most cases, there 
is a lack of definitional clarity, often resulting from weak theoretical foundations, alongside some 
methodological limitations in their construction (Ferreira 2017). The proposal in this paper follows 
the line of recent work taking multidimensionality into account (e.g. Gravingholt et al. 2015). 
However, it departs from these approaches in that it considers state ineffectiveness and political 
violence as the two dimensions of fragility and measures them separately using principal 
components analysis (PCA). 
3.1 Concept  
The definition of state fragility starts by considering the role of the state in society. I adopt a 
political economy view, which is centred on the core functions of the state and aligned with the 
post-Washington Consensus view of economic development (Stiglitz 2002). According to this 
perspective, and following the list of ‘minimal’ functions advanced in World Bank (1997: 27), it is 
argued that, in order to promote development, the state must provide a set of public goods and 
protect the poor.  
This normative standpoint is then complemented with positive considerations about the actual 
role of the state. These are derived from Besley and Persson’s (2011) theoretical model, according 
to which a peaceful state with high levels of state capacity will emerge if institutions are sufficiently 
cohesive and there is a common interest in providing public goods. However, if this is not the 
case, two pathologies of the state can emerge. Either there is: i) ‘state ineffectiveness in enforcing 
contracts, protecting property, providing public goods and raising revenues’; or there is ii) ‘political 
violence either in the form of repression or civil conflict’; or even iii) both pathologies are present 
at the same time (Besley and Persson 2011: 373). This paper considers that there is state fragility 
when the country exhibits one or both of these symptoms; and the higher their level, the greater 
will be the degree of state fragility. 
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3.2 Measure 
The indicators listed in Table 1 were chosen to represent cues that reveal the presence of the two 
symptoms, subject to data availability (further details about their sources are described in the 
Appendix, Table A).  
PCA is a procedure to reduce a set of highly correlated variables into a smaller number of 
components, which are orthogonal to each other. The state ineffectiveness index was obtained by 
applying PCA to the set of variables representing state effectiveness, and then multiplying the 
resulting scores for the first principal component by -1, in order to transform this variable into a 
measure of state ineffectiveness. Similarly, the political violence index results from the application 
of PCA to the set of variables describing political violence. The dataset included data for all the 
countries available over the period 1993–2012, and PCA provided a score on state ineffectiveness 
for 158 countries, and on political violence for 166 countries8. 
The same method was used to derive two versions of a unidimensional index of state fragility. The 
first results from the first principal component obtained from applying PCA to the 
aforementioned indices of state ineffectiveness and political violence (version 1). The second is 
the first principal component obtained from applying PCA to all of the indicators listed in Table 
1 (version 2). 
Table 1. Variables used in the construction of the indices 
Symptom Elements Proxies 
State 
ineffectiveness 
Contract enforcement Rule of law 
Regulatory quality 
Independence of judiciary 
Control of corruption 
Protection of property Property rights enforcement 
Public goods provision Government effectiveness 
Public health expenditure 
Access to improved water 
Authority Failure of state authority 
Political 
violence 
Repression Physical integrity 
Empowerment rights 
Political terror scale 
Civil conflict Major episodes of civil violence 
Armed conflict 
Coups d’état 
Revolutionary wars 
Ethnic wars 
Source: Author’s construction. 
4 Empirical model and data 
The tradition of using cross-country regressions to examine economic growth and its determinants 
has been established since the early studies towards the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s. The use of growth regressions in development economics stems from the interest in 
understanding the underlying factors that explain the differences in the economic performance of 
                                                 
8 See Figures A and B in the Appendix for more details on the distribution of these scores in each of the periods 
considered.  
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countries. This has led to a plethora of studies examining different growth determinants.9 The 
empirical basis used here is largely in line with this literature and can be represented as follows: 
𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 log𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,0 + 𝛿𝛿𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖                 (1) 
where 𝑖𝑖 indexes countries, 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 is per capita real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, 𝛼𝛼 is a 
constant, log𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,0 is the logarithm of the initial level of per capital real GDP, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 represents the 
error term. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 includes covariates, which can vary greatly from paper to paper, given that growth 
theory does not provide a definite list for these determinants. In the face of this challenge, recent 
studies include their variable of interest and use the results from previous empirical studies as a 
guideline for the choice of control variables. 
In order to test whether there is an effect of state fragility on growth, and in line with the 
multidimensional approach proposed in this paper, I add to this formulation a term to capture 
state ineffectiveness and another to capture political violence. These are represented in equation 
(2) by 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , respectively. Their corresponding coefficients, 𝛾𝛾1 and 𝛾𝛾2, measure how growth 
is affected by each of these dimensions. Bearing in mind that higher levels of state ineffectiveness 
and of political violence are interpreted as higher levels of state fragility, and according to the 
postulate that higher levels of fragility have a detrimental effect on growth, the expectation is that 
they have a negative sign. 
              𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 log𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖                (2) 
The matrix of the state resulting from Besley and Persson’s (2011) model identifies different types 
of states, resulting from the combination of the two symptoms. For instance, the economic 
performance of a weak state at peace is likely to be different from that of a repressive, but effective 
state. Inspired by this, I introduce an interaction term between state ineffectiveness and political 
violence in equation (3). Thus, 𝛾𝛾3 allows one to examine whether the effect of state ineffectiveness, 
or political violence, on growth is different for different values of political violence, or state 
ineffectiveness. 
               𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 log𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖               (3) 
When compared to the studies testing the effect of state fragility on growth reviewed in the 
previous section, this approach differs by using two distinct indices to proxy for the dimensions 
of state fragility separately, and by employing a continuous measure of state fragility rather than a 
dummy for whether a country is fragile. 
Given that the annual scores for the index of state ineffectiveness are available only from 1996, 
and in order to maximize the use of the data available, the estimations in this paper were carried 
out considering the period 1993–2012. The first set of results was obtained with cross-country 
data for one 20-year horizon (1993–2012) and two 10-year horizons (1993–2002 and 2003–12); 
panel data considering 5-year averages (starting in period 1993–97) and 10-year averages (starting 
in period 1993–2002) were used later in the analysis.  
Following the standard practice in the literature, the average of the annual growth rate of real GDP 
is used as dependent variable. State ineffectiveness and political violence are measured using the 
two indices described above. As mentioned before, there is no definite list of growth determinants. 
                                                 
9 I refer to Maier (2010) for a review of growth models and economic explanations for underdevelopment in the 
context of fragile states. 
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Inspired by some influential work by Bosworth and Collins’ (2003) and Sala-i-Martin et al.’s (2004), 
the following were chosen as control variables: initial level of per capita GDP; education; change 
and variability of the terms of trade; measure of geography; inflation; budget balance; trade policy. 
In addition to these, regional dummies were included for Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, and Latin 
America, as well as time dummies in the case of panel regressions. The samples of countries are 
listed in Table B in the Appendix whereas Table C includes the full details of the sources and 
construction of the variables. Tables D and E show the descriptive statistics for the datasets used.10 
5 Results analysis 
5.1 Initial results 
State ineffectiveness and political violence 
I begin the analysis with the regressions estimated with OLS. The cross-country results are 
represented in Table 2. Columns with odd numbers were obtained with the specification in 
equation (2), whereas even numbered columns result from adding the interaction between state 
ineffectiveness and political violence, in order to estimate equation (3). 
Focusing on the variables of interest, state ineffectiveness has a negative and significant effect on 
economic growth in all specifications. This is in line with the conclusions from previous related 
work (as discussed in section 2). For instance, for period 1993–2012, column (1), the estimated 
coefficient suggests that, if the position of a country in terms of state ineffectiveness moves from 
the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile, the state ineffectiveness index would rise by approximately 
3.19, from -1.28 to 1.91. If it did rise by this amount, then growth would fall by almost 1 percentage 
point. In contrast with the intuition from theory, the coefficient for political violence reveals a 
positive and significant effect in two of the periods considered.  
  
                                                 
10 The pairwise correlations between the variables and an analysis of the variance inflation factors (Kennedy 2008: 
199) did not show any reasons for concern about the potential for multicollinearity. 
8 
Table 2. Cross-country OLS estimations 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 20-year 10-year 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Initial pc GDP, log -1.410*** -1.437*** -1.221*** -1.228*** -1.484*** -1.532*** 
 (0.258) (0.244) (0.285) (0.277) (0.226) (0.210) 
Education 0.0314* 0.0300 0.0185 0.0176 0.0451** 0.0437** 
 (0.0187) (0.0188) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0182) (0.0179) 
Terms of trade growth 0.00530 0.00531 -0.112* -0.109* 0.00331 0.00371 
 (0.00536) (0.00530) (0.0660) (0.0648) (0.00585) (0.00573) 
St. dev. terms of trade 0.00387 0.00479 0.0399 0.0447 0.0171 0.0143 
 (0.00990) (0.00986) (0.0399) (0.0369) (0.0145) (0.0140) 
Geography 0.231 0.234 -0.0326 -0.0113 -0.236 -0.193 
 (0.260) (0.257) (0.288) (0.290) (0.236) (0.228) 
Initial inflation -0.557 -0.473 -0.287 -0.326 19.93*** 21.31*** 
 (0.467) (0.479) (0.448) (0.470) (4.108) (4.215) 
Initial budget balance 0.0674 0.0638 0.0551 0.0470 0.0967** 0.107*** 
 (0.0421) (0.0419) (0.0464) (0.0473) (0.0368) (0.0351) 
Initial trade policy 0.236 0.153 1.080** 0.971** 0.155 -0.110 
 (0.514) (0.538) (0.465) (0.475) (0.563) (0.518) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.279*** -1.316*** -2.558*** -2.551*** -1.187** -1.198** 
 (0.477) (0.462) (0.685) (0.687) (0.542) (0.494) 
East Asia 1.127 1.204* 0.404 0.478 1.063** 1.218*** 
 (0.724) (0.685) (0.806) (0.831) (0.426) (0.405) 
Latin America 0.272 0.241 -1.227** -1.223** -0.125 -0.164 
 (0.440) (0.441) (0.558) (0.558) (0.534) (0.530) 
State ineffectiveness (SI) -0.303*** -0.344** -0.382*** -0.416*** -0.375*** -0.446*** 
 (0.110) (0.146) (0.144) (0.145) (0.118) (0.106) 
Political violence (PV) 0.183* 0.186* -0.0999 -0.102 0.280*** 0.302*** 
 (0.0980) (0.0968) (0.113) (0.113) (0.0907) (0.0789) 
SI x PV   -0.0275  -0.0282  -0.0579 
  (0.0782)  (0.0844)  (0.0406) 
Constant 13.88*** 14.24*** 11.83*** 12.01*** 13.08*** 13.86*** 
 (2.387) (2.272) (2.598) (2.452) (2.050) (1.941) 
Observations 92 92 87 87 80 80 
R2 0.456 0.459 0.456 0.458 0.663 0.675 
Adj. R2 0.365 0.361 0.359 0.352 0.597 0.606 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the data described in the Appendix. 
The results in columns (2), (4), and (6) do not suggest that there is a significant interactive effect 
between state ineffectiveness and political violence. The magnitude of the coefficients is similar 
across specifications and they all exhibit a negative sign, but none is significant. Additionally, the 
overall conclusions for the main variables of interest are maintained when the interaction term is 
included. 
I turn now to the evidence obtained using panel data, considering the 5-year and 10-year averages, 
represented in Table 3, columns (1)–(4). Starting with the 5-year averaged data, the expected 
negative effect of state ineffectiveness persists when panel data are considered. However, it loses 
significance after the inclusion of the interaction term. The coefficient obtained for political 
violence is positive, but small in magnitude and not significant, and again the result for the 
interaction term does not lend support to the existence of an interactive effect of these two 
variables on growth. 
Considering the 10-year averaged data, the adverse effect of state ineffectiveness holds when this 
data structure is considered, and also when the interaction term is added. The coefficient for 
political violence remains roughly the same, with a small reduction in magnitude, but still non-
significant. The inclusion of the state ineffectiveness x political violence term does not cause major 
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variations to the coefficients of the two variables, and despite the change in sign, it remains small 
in magnitude and non-significant. 
Table 3. Panel OLS and FE estimations 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 OLS estimates  FE estimates 
 5-year averages 10-year averages  5-year averages 10-year averages 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
In. pc GDP, 
log 
-1.226*** -1.187*** -1.572*** -1.577***  -8.273*** -8.517*** -6.408*** -6.546*** 
 (0.327) (0.322) (0.235) (0.221)  (2.560) (2.555) (1.112) (1.141) 
Education 0.0407** 0.0428** 0.0375*** 0.0372***  0.0100 0.00357 -0.0287 -0.0310 
 (0.0176) (0.0174) (0.0143) (0.0141)  (0.0391) (0.0392) (0.0278) (0.0268) 
Terms trade 
gr. 
0.00317 0.00281 -0.00233 -0.00224  -0.00484 -0.00674 -0.000116 -0.000498 
 (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.00828) (0.00821)  (0.0102) (0.00969) (0.00590) (0.00600) 
Geography 0.127 0.107 -0.146 -0.141      
 (0.240) (0.249) (0.219) (0.222)      
Inflation 1.138** 1.078** 0.189 0.183  0.916*** 0.912*** -1.224* -1.120* 
 (0.522) (0.441) (0.528) (0.547)  (0.283) (0.277) (0.694) (0.674) 
Budget 
balance 
0.130*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.124***  0.0927 0.0923 0.0358 0.0374 
 (0.0462) (0.0475) (0.0366) (0.0364)  (0.0789) (0.0727) (0.0554) (0.0555) 
Trade policy -0.407 -0.253 0.0648 0.0260  -0.589 -0.689 -1.179 -1.257 
 (0.734) (0.690) (0.538) (0.468)  (1.165) (1.110) (0.931) (0.887) 
SSA -1.929*** -1.887*** -2.158*** -2.157***      
 (0.538) (0.548) (0.569) (0.569)      
East Asia 0.912 0.826 0.686 0.703      
 (0.651) (0.583) (0.575) (0.520)      
Latin America -0.457 -0.429 -0.501 -0.502      
 (0.406) (0.418) (0.402) (0.403)      
State ineff. 
(SI) 
-0.238* -0.190 -0.322*** -0.331***  -0.403 -0.585 0.767 0.698 
 (0.126) (0.145) (0.0990) (0.105)  (0.623) (0.654) (0.514) (0.533) 
Pol. viol. (PV) 0.0754 0.0689 0.0545 0.0560  -0.0771 -0.156 -0.206 -0.276 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.0977) (0.0933)  (0.291) (0.286) (0.319) (0.365) 
SI x PV  0.0407  -0.00741   0.182  0.0808 
  (0.0700)  (0.0697)   (0.144)  (0.149) 
Constant 13.05*** 12.05*** 16.04*** 16.14***  75.96*** 77.81*** 61.35*** 62.37*** 
 (3.102) (3.046) (2.384) (2.099)  (22.50) (22.44) (10.04) (10.24) 
Observations 198 198 167 167  228 228 197 197 
R2 0.325 0.328 0.322 0.322  0.395 0.404 0.518 0.521 
Adj. R2 0.273 0.273 0.264 0.260  0.367 0.374 0.495 0.495 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Time dummies also included 
in the regressions. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the data described in the Appendix. 
Given that using a panel structure allows one to account for individual heterogeneity, I explore 
this possibility further. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier test (Breusch and Pagan 1980) 
provided support for this decision when applied to the 5-year averages dataset. The F-test that the 
observed and unobserved fixed effects are equal to zero indicated that one rejects the null 
hypothesis, suggesting the use of the fixed effects estimator. Additionally, the result of the 
Hausman test, frequently used to compare fixed effects and random effects, led to the rejection of 
the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficient with random effects is efficient, thus, deeming 
fixed effects as the preferred model. 
In light of this, I estimated the coefficients with fixed-effects (FE) methods, presented in columns 
(5)–(8) in Table 3. They show a loss of significance of the negative coefficient for state 
ineffectiveness, whereas the coefficient for political violence and the interaction term remain non-
significant in any of the specifications.  Still, these results should be regarded with caution. FE 
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estimators are useful when one wants to analyse the impact of variables that vary over time, but a 
recognized problem in the literature is that they will not be appropriate for variables that change 
slowly over time. In fact, the limited time variation of state ineffectiveness and political violence 
may be the reason for the lack of a significant effect for these two indices. 11 
Unidimensional index of state fragility 
In order to test the claim in this paper that it is important to consider the two indices separately, I 
compare the results above with those obtained with a single index of state fragility. This is explored 
by using the two versions described in section 3 to replace state ineffectiveness and political 
violence in the growth regression. The results for cross-section and panel data are reported in 
Table 4. For brevity, I include only the coefficients obtained for the two indices.  
Table 4. Cross-country and panel OLS estimations with a single index of state fragility 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 CROSS-COUNTRY DATA  PANEL DATA 
 20-year 10-year  5-year averages 10-year averages  1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Version 1 -0.00254  -0.567***  0.0731   -0.0335  -0.253  
 (0.193)  (0.205)  (0.215)   (0.219)  (0.183)  
Version 2  -0.106  -0.353***  -0.0971   -0.102  -0.203** 
  (0.0857)  (0.0980)  (0.0983)   (0.107)  (0.0835) 
Obs. 92 92 87 87 80 80  198 198 167 167 
R2 0.401 0.409 0.443 0.460 0.599 0.603  0.312 0.315 0.296 0.308 
Adj. R2 0.311 0.320 0.353 0.372 0.527 0.532  0.263 0.267 0.241 0.254 
Notes: The control variables are the same as in Tables 2 and 3. Robust and cluster robust standard errors in 
parentheses for cross-country and panel estimates, respectively. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the data described in the Appendix.  
The results concur to the argument that, by considering a single index of state fragility, one may 
be overlooking the effect of different aspects of this phenomenon. With the exception of the 10-
year period between 1993 and 2002, the coefficients for neither of the state fragility indices show 
a significant effect on economic growth. When considering panel data, only one of the obtained 
coefficients for each version of the index shows a significant impact of state fragility.  
5.2 Robustness checks 
In order to test the robustness of the results obtained before, a few additional estimations were 
performed. First, I consider the potential influence of certain observations on the obtained results. 
The results from a preliminary analysis of potential outliers12 called for closer scrutiny of the 
influence of the following observations in the case of cross-country data: i) Israel, Colombia, India 
and Dem. Rep. Congo for period 1993–2012; ii) India and Brazil for period 1993–2002; and iii) 
Colombia, India, Algeria, Russia and Venezuela for period 2003–12. For panel data, the methods 
identified as potential outliers the observations for: i) Myanmar in 2003–07 and Brazil in 1993–97 
with 5-year averaged data; and ii) Burundi and Brazil in period 1993–2002 with 10-year averages. 
                                                 
11 An analysis of the variation of these variables over time indicated that most variation is explained by differences 
between rather than within countries. 
12 I adopted the Hadi (1992) procedure for identifying multiple outliers as implemented by Roodman (2007). 
Additionally, I considered the potential outliers in terms of growth rates by using a graphical procedure that consists 
in the observation of a leverage-versus-squared-residual plot. I consider 0.4 as the threshold level for leverage values. 
11 
The results are not reported here for reasons of space, but they showed similar coefficients for 
state ineffectiveness, with a significant effect in almost all specifications. The coefficient for 
political violence lost significance when cross-country data was used and remained positive and 
non-significant with panel data. Finally, the results for the interaction term between the two 
variables remained roughly the same. 
As mentioned in section 4, there is no definite list of controls, and different authors use different 
sets of explanatory variables. In order to account for the possible changes resulting from using 
other covariates, I ran an additional set of regressions adding the following three covariates, which 
can be frequently found, for instance, in the literature examining the link between aid and growth 
(e.g. Rajan and Subramanian 2008): the M2 as a ratio of GDP as a proxy for the level of depth of 
the financial system; the average number of revolutions; and an indicator of ethnic 
fractionalization.13 
The results for state ineffectiveness were similar to those obtained before for both cross-country 
and panel data. There was some variation in the sign and significance level of the coefficient for 
political violence, suggesting that, as observed before, the results change with the specification 
considered. The interaction term between state ineffectiveness and political violence remained 
non-significant. 
The final possibility addressed in this section is related to the fact that the dimensions captured by 
the state ineffectiveness index are similar to those usually included in measures of institutional 
quality. A preliminary analysis performed to ascertain the potential for multicollinearity14 showed 
that the state ineffectiveness index is highly correlated with the ICRG indicator of quality of 
government, which is frequently used as an indicator of the quality of institutions in a country. 
The results in Table 5 include, first, the coefficients estimated for the main variables of interest 
when both the ICRG and the state ineffectiveness index are included in the analysis, and then the 
results obtained when the ICRG replaces the state ineffectiveness index. 
Table 5. Cross-country and panel OLS estimations with ICRG 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 CROSS-COUNTRY DATA  PANEL DATA 
 20-year 10-year  5-year averages 10-year averages  1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ICRG -0.0361 3.377** 2.068 4.010*** -0.964 2.160*  -0.224 1.935 0.610 2.276** 
 (1.829) (1.436) (2.150) (1.510) (2.852) (1.106)  (1.600) (1.289) (1.632) (1.140) 
State 
inef.  
-0.363**  -0.377**  -0.392   -0.313*  -0.307**  
 (0.138)  (0.184)  (0.292)   (0.161)  (0.142)  
Pol. viol. 0.198** 0.164* -0.0201 -0.0618 0.281*** 0.233**  0.119 0.0322 0.124 0.113 
 (0.0937) (0.0924) (0.0896) (0.0977) (0.0957) (0.101)  (0.109) (0.115) (0.0818) (0.0866) 
Obs. 85 87 80 83 75 76  186 193 155 159 
R2 0.516 0.505 0.529 0.604 0.682 0.661  0.368 0.343 0.379 0.427 
Adj. R2 0.420 0.417 0.427 0.529 0.608 0.590  0.312 0.292 0.317 0.376 
Notes: The control variables are the same as in Tables 2 and 3. Robust and cluster robust standard errors in 
parentheses for cross-country and panel estimates, respectively. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the data described in the Appendix. 
                                                 
13 The multicollinearity analysis was repeated for the new set of variables and no concerns were raised.  
14 As described earlier, this considered the pairwise correlations between the variables and the variance inflation factors 
(Kennedy 2008: 199). 
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When considering cross-country data, with the exception of the period 2003–12, the coefficient 
for state ineffectiveness remains negative and significant, which suggests that the obtained results 
are robust even when controlling for the quality of institutions in the country. However, even if 
not significant in any of the regressions with the two indices, the coefficient for ICRG shows a 
significant positive effect when the state ineffectiveness index is dropped from the analysis. 
Turning now to panel data, again state ineffectiveness remains negative and significant after the 
inclusion of ICRG. Similar to before, when state ineffectiveness is not included, the coefficient 
for the ICRG index is positive, though significant only with the dataset with 10-year averages.15 
5.3 Addressing endogeneity 
Given the nature of the two variables used to proxy for state fragility, there is a risk that the use 
of OLS methods leads to biased regressors for two main reasons. The first is the potential for 
omitted variables. For instance, it is possible that state ineffectiveness and growth respond 
simultaneously to an omitted factor, such as the historical evolution of the nation in question 
(Mendez and Sepulveda 2006), which would, however, be hard to control for, given the challenges 
of finding an appropriate indicator and the limitations in terms of data availability. 
The second reason is that, while the interest in this paper is to test whether state fragility affects 
economic growth, as pointed out by Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2010), it is plausible to assume that 
the causality runs in the opposite direction, i.e. from growth to state fragility. For instance, it could 
be the case that countries with higher rates of economic growth have more resources to fight 
against and control corruption (Mendez and Sepulveda 2006: 91). It is also more likely that richer 
economies choose strong fiscal systems, or they have, at least, the ability to do so (Dincecco and 
Prado 2012: 172). Also, income levels and income growth have been explored at length in the 
literature examining the causes of conflict (see, for instance, Blattman and Miguel 2010 or 
Humphreys 2003), with some authors finding a significant relationship between the two (e.g. 
Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Miguel et al. 2004). 
In light of these issues, the following paragraphs present the results from exploring a series of 
strategies for overcoming the potential endogeneity of state ineffectiveness and political violence 
separately. The interaction term between state ineffectiveness and political violence poses 
additional challenges in terms of finding an appropriate instrument. Thus, in order to simplify the 
analysis, this term is not included in the discussion that follows. 
The estimates represented in Table 6 were obtained after applying instrumental variable (IV) 
procedures in order to address the potential endogeneity of state ineffectiveness. Three alternatives 
were considered to instrument for state ineffectiveness. First, I use the time-invariant variable 
representing the logarithm of the settler mortality estimates provided by Acemoglu et al. (2001). 
According to these authors, the diseases that potential European settlers faced in the colonies 
(mostly malaria and yellow fever) influenced the patterns of settlement and the type of institutions 
that were put in place, but did not have a major effect on the health and economy of indigenous 
people. The estimated coefficients correspond to Results A. One observes that the coefficient for 
state ineffectiveness maintains its negative sign, but it is not significant in any of the datasets 
considered. Political violence shows a positive coefficient, which is significant only when the 20-
                                                 
15 The argument for the disintegration of state fragility proposed here was taken to the extreme by including all the 
variables used in the construction of each index as separate regressors. The obtained coefficients (which can be 
obtained from the author upon request) are preliminary, thus I simply highlight that public expenditure in health, 
failure of state authority and coups d’état were the only variables showing a significant effect in more than one 
specification. 
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year period is used. Still, the results for some of the standard tests for instrument strength, namely 
the p-value of the Kleibergen-Paap Lagrange-Multiplier (LM) statistic and the first-stage F-statistic 
(Staiger and Stock 1997) indicate that the logarithm of settler mortality is not a strong instrument 
for the purposes of this analysis. 
Secondly, I employ Hall and Jones’ (1999) list of instruments. The first is a time-invariant variable 
representing the distance to the equator, obtained by taking the absolute value of latitude in degrees 
and dividing it by 90 to obtain a 0–1 scale. The authors argue that at the start of the fifteenth 
century Western Europeans were more likely to move and settle in regions that were sparsely 
populated and with a similar climate to Western Europe, and these criteria suggest regions far from 
the equator. I also include the fraction of a country’s population speaking one of the five primary 
Western European languages (English, French, German, Portuguese, and Spanish) as a mother 
tongue in the present (considering 1999 as the present), which, according to the authors, will be 
correlated with the extent of Western European influence. The percentage of the population 
speaking English as a mother tongue is also included in order to allow for the potential of a 
separate impact. The fourth variable is Frankel and Romer’s (1996) log of predicted trade share. 
Table 6. Cross-country and panel IV estimations with instruments for state ineffectiveness 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 CROSS-COUNTRY DATA  PANEL DATA 
 Results A: Log(settler mortality) 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012  5-year averages 10-year averages 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
State ineffectiveness -0.195 -0.810 -0.907  -1.124 -0.840 
 (0.931) (0.574) (0.903)  (0.804) (0.687) 
Political violence 0.297*** 0.0245 0.365  0.249 0.212 
 (0.113) (0.135) (0.239)  (0.155) (0.203) 
Observations 58 55 48  136 103 
R2 0.531 0.553 0.576  0.361 0.428 
p-value LM stat 0.0906 0.0157 0.171  0.0339 0.0185 
F-stat weak ident. 2.401 5.340 1.669  4.465 5.412 
 Results B: Dist. equator; Eur. language; English language; FR trade share 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012  5-year averages 10-year averages 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
State ineffectiveness -0.451* -0.796** -0.000448  -0.631* -0.525 
 (0.272) (0.395) (0.264)  (0.380) (0.323) 
Political violence 0.194* -0.0358 0.178  0.0777 0.0707 
 (0.0998) (0.103) (0.119)  (0.102) (0.106) 
Observations 91 86 79  196 165 
R2 0.450 0.393 0.614  0.295 0.320 
p-value LM stat 0.000141 0.000506 0.00341  0.000447 0.000335 
F-stat weak ident. 8.632 8.296 7.235  9.348 10.38 
 Results C: Dist. equator; European language 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012  5-year averages 10-year averages 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
State ineffectiveness -0.488* -0.774** -0.135  -0.557 -0.591** 
 (0.268) (0.371) (0.242)  (0.364) (0.301) 
Political violence 0.199** -0.0385 0.204*  0.0713 0.0810 
 (0.100) (0.101) (0.109)  (0.102) (0.103) 
Observations 91 86 79  196 165 
R2 0.445 0.398 0.644  0.304 0.311 
p-value LM stat 1.75e-05 0.000123 0.000503  7.72e-05 6.61e-05 
F-stat weak ident. 15.22 11.88 11.50  12.97 13.77 
Notes: The controls are the same as in Tables 2 and 3. Robust and cluster robust standard errors in parentheses 
for cross-country and panel estimates, respectively. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Source: Author’s calculation based on the data described in the Appendix. 
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Results B show the obtained coefficients. They indicate that the negative effect of state 
ineffectiveness on growth holds again in all periods, and it is now significant in two of the periods 
with cross-country data and for the panel dataset obtained with 5-year averages. The term for 
political violence is positive and significant with period 1993–2012, but the sign changes and it is 
non-significant for the remaining periods, which suggests that the result is not robust across 
specifications. This instrumentation strategy is stronger than the one previously described. It 
passes the overidentification test, although the value for the F-test is still below the threshold level 
considered to rule out instrumentation weakness in most specifications.  
Thirdly, based on the significance levels of the four variables used as instruments in the first-stage 
regressions (not presented here for space reasons), I dropped the fraction of the population 
speaking English and the measure of trade share, and kept only the distance to the equator and 
the fraction of the population speaking a European language as exogenous instruments. The 
estimated coefficients are represented by Results C and are similar to the ones obtained with the 
four instruments. State ineffectiveness holds a negative coefficient in all specifications, but it is 
significant only when cross-country data for the 20-year period and for the decade 1993–2002 are 
used and for the panel dataset obtained with 10-year averages. The sign and significance level of 
the coefficient for political violence once again vary with the period considered, and it is positive 
and significant in only two out of the five specifications. This instrumentation strategy passes both 
tests of instrument weakness in all specifications, as shown in the last two rows of the table, which 
suggests an improvement in terms of the strength of the instrument.16 
Finding an appropriate instrument for political violence is equally challenging, leading some 
authors to prefer the use of GMM methods (e.g. Biswas et al. 2016; Bodea and Elbadawi 2008). 
However, given the limitations of these methods17, I opt for exploring two different approaches 
here. The first strategy consisted in using the initial value of political violence in the regressions. 
Overall, the coefficients obtained (Table 7, Results A) do not show significant differences in terms 
of the signs and significance levels for the two variables of interest. In fact, one still observes a 
positive coefficient for political violence in most cases, but it is only significant in two of the five 
specifications. The significant negative effect of state ineffectiveness remains in all regressions. 
Table 7. Cross-country and panel OLS estimations with initial level of political violence and IV estimates with food 
prices as instrument 
 Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
 CROSS-COUNTRY DATA  PANEL DATA 
 Results A: OLS estimates with initial level of political violence 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012  5-year averages 10-year averages 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
State ineffectiveness -0.303*** -0.382*** -0.375***  -0.238* -0.322*** 
 (0.110) (0.144) (0.118)  (0.126) (0.0990) 
Political violence, initial 0.183* -0.0999 0.280***  0.0754 0.0545 
 (0.0980) (0.113) (0.0907)  (0.106) (0.0977) 
Observations 92 87 80  198 167 
R2 0.456 0.456 0.663  0.325 0.322 
Adj. R2 0.365 0.359 0.597  0.273 0.264 
                                                 
16 In an additional attempt to overcome the problem that weak instruments may lead to estimated coefficients that 
are biased towards OLS, I use Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimation. Following Ricciuti et 
al. (2016: 25), I use the Fuller’s version of LIML and employ the Fuller 4 version (Fuller 1977). In the just identified 
case, the IV and the LIML estimators are the same. Thus, this strategy was only employed when Hall and Jones’ (1999) 
instruments were used, and when these were restricted. The results are in line with the IV estimations and are available 
from the author upon request. 17 See, for instance, Frot and Perrotta (2012). 
15 
 Results B: IV estimates with food prices as instrument 
 1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012  5-year averages 10-year averages 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
State ineffectiveness -0.617** -0.754** -0.428**  -0.418 -0.549* 
 (0.297) (0.377) (0.196)  (0.326) (0.281) 
Political violence 1.325 1.490 0.618  1.047 1.071 
 (0.863) (1.079) (0.568)  (0.870) (0.863) 
Observations 88 83 78  147 161 
R2 -0.311 -0.728 0.660  -0.076 -0.100 
p-value LM stat 0.106 0.101 0.186  0.113 0.152 
F-stat weak ident. 2.635 2.374 1.568  2.539 1.944 
Notes: The controls are the same as in Tables 2 and 3. Robust and cluster robust standard errors in parentheses 
for cross-country and panel estimates, respectively. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the data described in the Appendix. 
The second attempt considered a food price index (Food and Agriculture Organization 2016) 
averaged across the relevant period as an instrument for political violence. This is inspired by the 
work that finds a positive causal link between rising food prices and social unrest (e.g. Arezki and 
Bruckner 2011; Bellemare 2014). The results obtained for cross-country and panel data, portrayed 
in Table 7, Results B, cast serious doubts on the strength of this variable as an instrument. There 
was a dramatic loss in the explanatory power of the model and the tests for instrument weakness 
are failed across specifications. 
6 Discussion of the results 
This section draws together the insights from the results obtained and positions them in relation 
to the main conclusions found in previous literature. Still, before doing that, it is important to 
recognize some limitations in the analysis. Firstly, the sample of countries included is reduced 
when compared to other analyses on fragile states, and the period covered is limited in comparison 
to previous work using growth regressions. These two limitations are a result of the challenges in 
terms of data availability. Secondly, the strategies used to minimize the bias resulting from the 
endogeneity of state ineffectiveness and political violence are far from perfect. Nonetheless, it is 
my belief that they uncovered some interesting facts. 
The estimated coefficients for state ineffectiveness seem unanimous in terms of the sign of the 
effect, which is significant in most cases. Thus, the results in this paper strongly suggest that 
countries with higher levels of state ineffectiveness are expected to grow at lower rates. This is in 
line with the theory described in section 2, which suggests that in general there is a positive link 
between state capacity and economic growth, and more specifically that the quality of institutions 
is an important determinant. The indicator for state ineffectiveness comprises different 
dimensions of the capacity as well as the effectiveness of the state, thus lending support to the 
view that attributes an important role to the state in the promotion of development. 
The conclusion for the effect of political violence is less clear. When cross-country data are used, 
the sign and significance level of the coefficient seem to vary depending on the period and 
estimation method applied. With panel data, the positive sign seems more pervasive across 
specifications, but it is rarely significant. I, therefore, conclude that the model used in this paper 
fails to find a definite conclusion about the impact of political violence on growth, though the 
estimated coefficients seem to indicate that there is no causal effect.  
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Even though, at face value, the latter result seems to be at odds with the intuition, as pointed out 
in Serneels and Verpoorten (2015), economic theory is not consensual about the effect of conflict 
on growth. The standard neoclassical growth theory suggests that in the years after civil conflict, 
an economy could grow relatively fast and converge to its steady state. By contrast, alternative 
models argue that this catch-up effect could take a long time or that countries may be trapped in 
a situation with both conflict and dismal performance (Serneels and Verpoorten 2015: 556). 
Additional, one may think of China and India as examples of countries that may show a positive 
correlation between levels of political violence and growth rates. 
Finally, the coefficients obtained for the interaction term between state ineffectiveness and 
political violence do not suggest that the effect of state ineffectiveness (or political violence) on 
economic growth in a country depends on the level of political violence (or state ineffectiveness). 
7 Conclusions and implications 
This paper presents new evidence on the impact of state fragility on economic growth. Despite 
existing accounts of the weight that state fragility bears on economic development provided by 
the reports of development agencies and previous studies, there is a relative scarcity of empirical 
work on this topic that makes use of cross-country regressions. To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, this is the first analysis which shows that considering the two distinct aspects of state 
fragility unveils a link between fragility and growth, which is not necessarily visible if a 
unidimensional index is considered. 
Following the tradition in the cross-country growth literature, this paper explores the effect on 
growth of the two dimensions of state fragility identified in Besley and Persson’s (2011) theoretical 
model – state ineffectiveness and political violence. This is in line with previous literature 
considering the impact of related aspects, such as institutions, governance, or state capacity, as well 
as political violence, but aims to fill the gap that still exists in the studies focusing explicitly on the 
concept of fragile states. 
The results from applying OLS to data for period 1993–2012 show a robust negative and 
significant impact of state ineffectiveness on growth, but no significant effect for political violence. 
These distinct effects concur to the view that in order to unpack the complexity of state fragility 
and its effects, one should consider its different dimensions. This was further corroborated by the 
fact that, when using a unidimensional index of fragility, one failed to find a consistent effect of 
this variable on growth.  
This paper suggests a way forward. One of the main concerns of development agencies is the 
effectiveness of development assistance—especially in the case of fragile states—as demonstrated 
in recent reports. The measurement tools for state fragility proposed in this paper provide a new 
opportunity to examine how different dimensions of state fragility interact with the impact of aid 
on economic growth. 
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Appendix 
Table A. List of definitions, measures and data sources for the variables used in the construction of the fragility indices 
 Symptom Dimension Proxy Definition Measure Data source 
State in
effectiv
eness 
Contract enforcement Rule of law Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules in society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
The aggregate measure ranges from around -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better outcomes. Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2015a) Regulatory quality Captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. The aggregate measure ranges from around -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better outcomes. Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2015a) Enforcing contracts  Measures the efficiency of the judicial system in resolving a commercial dispute. Represents the number of days to resolve a commercial sale dispute through the courts (in calendar days). Doing business (World Bank, 2015b) Independence of the judiciary Captures the extent to which the judiciary is independent of control from other sources, such as another branch of the government or the military. A score of 0 indicates ‘not independent’, 1 represents ‘partially independent’, while 2 indicates ‘generally independent’. CIRI (Cingranelli, Richards and Clay, 2014) Control of corruption Captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests. 
The aggregate measure ranges from around -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better outcomes. Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2015a) Protection of property Property rights enforcement Measures the extent to which a country’s legal framework allows individuals to freely accumulate private property, secured by clear laws that are enforced effectively by the government. The scale is formed by scores ranging from 0 to 100 (0, 10, 20… 100), with the possibility of assigning intermediate scores, such as 75 or 45. Higher scores correspond to a more effective system of legal protection.  
Index of Economic Freedom (Miller et al., 2015) 
Public goods provision Government effectiveness  Captures perceptions of the quality of public services, quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. 
The aggregate measure ranges from around -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better outcomes. Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2015a) Government expenditure on education General government expenditure (current, capital, and transfers). It includes expenditure funded by transfers from international sources to government. Measured as a percentage of GDP. Expressed as a percentage of GDP in that year. World Bank (World Bank, 2016) Public health expenditure  Consists of recurrent and capital spending from government (central and local) budgets, external borrowings and grants (including donations from international agencies and nongovernmental organizations), and social (or compulsory) health insurance funds. Measured as a percentage of GDP. 
Expressed as a percentage of GDP in that year. World Bank (World Bank, 2016) 
Access to improved water Percentage of the population using an improved drinking water source. The improved drinking water source includes piped water on premises (piped household water connection located inside the Expressed as a percentage to the total population. World Bank (World Bank, 2016) 
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 Symptom Dimension Proxy Definition Measure Data source user’s dwelling, plot or yard), and other improved drinking water sources (public taps or standpipes, tube wells or boreholes, protected dug wells, protected springs, and rainwater collection). Raising revenues Tax revenue Tax revenue refers to compulsory transfers to the central government for public purposes. Certain compulsory transfers such as fines, penalties, and most social security contributions are excluded. Refunds and corrections of erroneously collected tax revenue are treated as negative revenue. Measured as a percentage of GDP. 
Expressed as a percentage of GDP in that year. World Bank (World Bank, 2016) 
Political authority Failure of state authority Refers to situations in which the institutions of the central state are weakened to the point that they can no longer maintain authority or political order in significant parts of the country. Examples of evidence include shut-downs of routine government services, failure of security forces and administrators to carry out any government directives, and anarchic conditions in large parts of the country, with attempts from rival militias, warlords, or local or regional authorities to establish autonomous zones of government, 
The scale ranges from 1 (adverse regime change with no significant weakening of state institutions or persistent collapse of public order) to 4 (complete collapse or near-total collapse of public order). A score of 0 was assigned a posteriori to periods with no regime change. 
Armed Conflict and Intervention, PITF (Marshall, Gurr and Harff, 2015) 
Politica
l violen
ce 
Repression Physical integrity The physical integrity rights index results from the addition of the scores for torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance indicators. Ranges from 0 (no government respect for these rights) to 8 (full government respect for these rights). CIRI (Cingranelli, Richards and Clay, 2014) Empowerment rights The empowerment rights index results from the addition of the scores for foreign movement, domestic movement, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, workers’ rights, electoral self-determination, and freedom of religion indicators. 
Ranges from 0 (no government respect for these rights) to 14 (full government respect for these rights). CIRI (Cingranelli, Richards and Clay, 2014) Political terror scale Measures the level of political violence that a country experiences in a given year, based on the amount of violations of physical or personal integrity rights carried out by a state (or its agents). Uses a 5-point coding scheme, with higher levels representing higher levels of ‘terror’. Average value of the scores provided by Amnesty International, the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, and Human Rights Watch’s World Reports.  
Political Terror Scale (Gibney et al., 2013) 
Civil conflict Major episodes of civil violence Total summed magnitudes of all societal major episodes of political violence involving the state in a certain year, namely episodes of civil violence, of civil warfare, of ethnic violence and of ethnic warfare. 
Total summed magnitudes of the four magnitude scores, each scaled from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) for each episode. A value of 0 was assigned a posteriori to periods with no episodes of civil violence. 
Armed Conflict and Intervention, MEPV (Marshall, 2015) 
Armed conflict Number of armed conflicts defined as contested incompatibilities that concern government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. 
The number of internal and internationalized conflict events was considered, and a value of 0 was assigned a posteriori to periods with no armed conflict. 
UCDP/PRIO (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Petterson and Wallensteen, 2015) Coups d’état Total sum of successful coups and attempted (but ultimately unsuccessful coups d’état). Sum of the number of successful coups and of attempted coups d’état that occurred in the year of record. A value of 0 was assigned a 
posteriori to periods with no coups. 
Polity IV, Coups d’état  (Marshall and Ramsey Marshall, 2015) Revolutionary wars Measures the annual magnitude of episodes of violent conflict between governments and politically organized groups (political Each of the magnitude scores ranges from 0 to 4. All decimal averages are assigned to decimal Armed Conflict and Intervention, PITF 
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 Symptom Dimension Proxy Definition Measure Data source challengers) that seek to overthrow the central government, to replace its leaders, or to seize power in one region. It is based on the average scores of number of rebel combatants or activists, annual number of fatalities related to fighting, and portion of country affected by fighting. 
scores of ‘0.5’. A score of -0.5 was assigned a 
posteriori to periods with no regime change. Higher vales correspond to higher magnitudes. (Marshall, Gurr and Harff, 2015) 
Ethnic wars Measures the annual magnitude of episodes of violent conflict between governments and national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities (ethnic challengers) in which the challengers seek major changes in their status. It is based on the average scores of number of rebel combatants or activists, annual number of fatalities related to fighting, and portion of country affected by fighting. 
Each of the magnitude scores ranges from 0 to 4. All decimal averages are assigned to decimal scores of ‘0.5’. A score of -0.5 was assigned a 
posteriori to periods with no regime change. Higher vales correspond to higher magnitudes. 
Armed Conflict and Intervention, PITF (Marshall, Gurr and Harff, 2015) 
Source: Author’s construction 
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Table B. Samples of countries 
 
Cross-country data  Panel data 
1993-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
 1993-2012 
5-year averages 
1993-2012 
10-year 
averages 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Bangladesh 
Belgium 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Lesotho 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Bangladesh 
Belgium 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Lesotho 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Thailand 
Algeria 
Australia 
Austria 
Bangladesh 
Belgium 
Benin 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Chile 
Colombia 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Cyprus 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Denmark 
Dominican Rep. 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Lesotho 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritius 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
United Kingdom 
United States 
 Algeria 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Bangladesh 
Belgium 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Lesotho 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Senegal 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Bangladesh 
Belgium 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Lesotho 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russian 
Federation 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Swaziland 
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Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Zambia 
 
Turkey 
Uganda 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Rep. 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Source: Author’s construction. 
 
Table C. Variables description 
Variable Data source Notes 
GDP per capita 
growth 
Penn World Tables 
v9.0 (Feenstra et al., 
2015) 
Compound annual growth rate of the ratio between real GDP at 
constant 2011 national prices (in mil. 2011US$) and population 
(in millions) over the relevant period. 
GDP per capita, log Penn World Tables 
v9.0 (Feenstra et al., 
2015) 
Logarithm of the ratio between real GDP at constant 2011 
national prices (in mil. 2011US$) and population (in millions) in 
the first year of the period for cross-country data and in the 
beginning of the relevant period for panel data. 
Education Barro and Lee (2013) Percentage of the population aged 15 and over for whom the 
secondary level is the highest level of education completed, 
averaged across the relevant period. 
Terms of trade World Bank (2016) Change in and variability (measured by the standard deviation) 
across the relevant period of the net barter terms of trade index 
(measured relative to the base year 2000). 
Geography Clemens et al. (2012) Time-invariant measure developed by Bosworth and Collins 
(2003), which averages the number of frost days and tropical 
land area. 
Inflation World Bank (2016) Logarithm of (1+inflation/100), with inflation measured by the 
consumer price index. Average in the first five years of the 
period in cross-country datasets, and across the relevant period 
in panel datasets. 
Budget balance World Bank (2016) Average of the levels of cash surplus/deficit (% of GDP) in first 
five years of the period for cross-country data, and across the 
relevant period in panel data. 
Trade policy Wacziarg and Welch 
(2003); Clemens et 
al. (2012) 
Sachs and Warner’s (1995) index of openness, updated until 
2001 by Wacziarg and Welch (2003), and then until 2005 by 
Clemens et al. (2012). Data for the first year available for the 
relevant period in the cross-country datasets, and average 
across the relevant period in panel data. 
State ineffectiveness Author’s calculation Index of state ineffectiveness, with higher levels representing 
more ineffective states. Averages across the relevant period. 
Political violence Author’s calculation Index of political violence, with higher levels representing more 
violent states. Averages across the relevant period. 
Life expectancy World Bank (2016) Level of life expectancy at birth, total (years). Data for the first 
year available for the relevant period in the cross-country 
datasets, and average across the relevant period in panel data. 
Financial depth World Bank (2016) Average of the levels of money and quasi money (M2) as % of 
GDP in first five years of the period for cross-country data, and 
across the relevant period in panel data. 
Revolutions Aisen and Veiga 
(2013) 
Average number of revolutions per year in the relevant time 
horizon from Databanks International (2009). (Data available 
only until 2005.) 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
Teorell et al. (2016) Arithmetic average of Alesina et al.’s (2003) measure of ethnic 
fractionalization over the period. Reflects the probability that two 
randomly selected people from a given country will not share 
the same ethnicity (which involves a combination of racial and 
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Notes: ‘Relevant period’ corresponds to the full period in the case of cross-country datasets, and to 5-year or 10-
year averages in the case of panel datasets. 
Source: Author’s construction.  
linguistic characteristics). The higher the number the lower the 
probability. 
ICRG Teorell et al. (2016) Arithmetic average of the ICRG indicator of quality of 
government over the period. This indicator is the mean value of 
the ICRG variables ‘Corruption’, ‘Law and Order’ and 
‘Bureaucracy Quality’, scaled 0-1. 
Settler mortality, log Teorell et al. (2016) Time-invariant variable representing the settler mortality rate 
faced by European settlers obtained by Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001). 
Distance to equator Hall and Jones 
(1999) 
Time-invariant variable obtained by taking the absolute value of 
latitude in degrees and dividing it by 90 to obtain a 0-1 scale. 
Population speaking 
an European 
language 
Rodrik, Subramanian 
and Trebbi (2002) 
Time-invariant variable that represents the fraction of a 
country’s population speaking one of the five primary Western 
European languages (English, French, German, Portuguese, 
and Spanish) as a mother tongue in the present (considering 
1999 as the present year). 
Population speaking 
English 
Rodrik, Subramanian 
and Trebbi (2002) 
Time-invariant variable that captures the percentage of the 
population speaking English as a mother tongue in the present 
(considering 1999 as the present year). 
Frankel and Romer’s 
log of predicted trade 
share 
Hall and Jones 
(1999) 
Time-invariant variable constructed by Frankel and Romer 
(1996) based on a gravity model of international trade that 
considers only the population of a country and its geographical 
characteristics. 
Domestic food price 
index 
Food and Agriculture 
Organization (2016) 
Level of the domestic food price index averaged across the 
relevant time period. 
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Table D. Descriptive statistics, cross-country data  Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max  Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max  Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max  1993-2012  1993-2002  2003-2012 Real GDP per capita growth 92 2.136641 1.576926 -2.011328 8.653811  87 1.882072 1.845489 -3.612879 7.208185  80 2.417622 1.887718 -1.072815 10.11893 Log(initial pc GDP) 92 8.827087 1.173076 5.831714 10.9823  87 8.92795 1.111673 6.469967 10.9823  80 8.915889 1.187617 5.831714 10.9823 Education 92 21.76891 11.98971 1.201902 50.53092  87 20.15492 11.9177 1.311274 53.82947  80 25.1612 12.97448 1.647901 52.95671 Change in terms of trade 92 3.73645 24.72288 -42.45064 103.2097  87 -.967539 2.791307 -9.782608 5.849472  80 -5.425709 33.85301 -130.7658 115.33 St. dev. of terms of trade 92 16.7738 15.06852 .9890673 75.80861  87 7.227754 8.076818 .0896293 40.78114  80 12.25825 12.95037 .9912537 56.95029 Geography 92 -.0422727 .9944857 -1.04 1.783878  87 .0092951 .9977092 -1.04 1.783878  80 .0206035 1.010335 -1.04 1.783878 Log(1+inflation) 92 .2156044 .5059478 .0074228 4.007075  87 .1716055 .3184602 .0074228 2.217585  80 .0559338 .0438649 .00037 .191469 Initial budget balance 92 -2.124591 3.350551 -8.871235 13.66614  87 -2.15153 3.430725 -8.871235 13.66614  80 -1.104589 3.795847 -8.528645 13.15924 Initial trade policy 92 .75 .4353854 0 1  87 .7816092 .4155492 0 1  80 .8625 .3465472 0 1 Sub-Saharan Africa 92 .2391304 .4288898 0 1  87 .2068966 .407429 0 1  80 .225 .4202169 0 1 East Asia 92 .1195652 .3262303 0 1  87 .1264368 .3342676 0 1  80 .125 .3328055 0 1 Latin America and Caribbean 92 .2282609 .4220114 0 1  87 .2298851 .4231979 0 1  80 .1875 .3927749 0 1 State ineffectiveness 92 -.4387873 2.643555 -5.382778 4.168341  87 -.6817894 2.524259 -5.094729 3.856543  80 -.7292272 2.706384 -5.5108 4.306918 Political violence 92 .000762 1.850667 -2.053569 7.550156  87 -.0178419 1.978693 -2.096025 7.658358  80 -.0328353 1.894972 -2.03281 7.429932 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the data described in Tables A and C. 
Table E. Descriptive statistics, panel data  Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max  Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max  5-year periods  10-year periods Real GDP per capita growth 198 2.612477 2.235379 -4.319879 12.29542  167 2.138623 1.879454 -3.612879 10.11893 Log(initial pc GDP) 198 8.945407 1.071635 6.238213 11.22593  167 8.941128 1.147029 6.157898 11.15617 Education 198 21.69387 12.33916 1.508707 57.03806  167 22.55314 12.64861 1.311274 53.82947 Terms of trade 198 -.9735745 12.18255 -88.2172 71.92255  167 -3.10319 23.54622 -130.7658 115.33 Geography 198 -.0684408 .9732804 -1.04 1.783878  167 .0147123 1.000762 -1.04 1.783878 Log(1+inflation) 198 .0876239 .1745852 -.0110155 2.217585  167 .0951365 .1729159 -.0008251 1.633731 Budget balance 198 -1.252692 3.46125 -10.95463 13.66614  167 -1.874662 3.393525 -9.621738 14.80713 Trade policy 198 .8558923 .33265 0 1  167 .8518962 .3390988 0 1 Sub-Saharan Africa 198 .1919192 .3948081 0 1  167 .2155689 .4124531 0 1 East Asia 198 .1363636 .3440442 0 1  167 .1257485 .3325629 0 1 Latin America and Caribbean 198 .2575758 .4384076 0 1  167 .2095808 .4082336 0 1 State ineffectiveness 198 -.5386637 2.425426 -5.440109 4.314941  167 -.7045141 2.605269 -5.5108 4.306918 Political violence 198 .0869463 2.000104 -2.096025 7.70021  167 -.0250243 1.933225 -2.096025 7.658358 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the data described in Tables A and C. 
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Figure A. Histograms for state ineffectiveness and political violence, cross-country data 1993-2012 
 
1993-2002 
 
2003-2012 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the data described in Table A. 
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Figure B. Histograms for state ineffectiveness and political violence, panel data 
5-year averages 
 
10-year averages 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the data described in Table A. 
 
